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Abstract 
Portugal and Greece have divergent histories with regard to Guaranteed 
Minimum Income (GMI), arguably the principal difference in the two countries’ 
evolutions of social assistance in recent decades. Neither had a GMI when EEC 
common criteria on sufficient resources and social assistance were issued in 1992. 
Portugal introduced a pilot programme in 1996 that went operational in 1997. Greece 
is among only a few European countries never to experiment with GMI. Only recently 
(in 2012) was a decision reached to launch a pilot GMI scheme, with implementation 
still forthcoming.  
An account for the different Portuguese and Greek GMI experiences 
emphasizes the importance of actors such as political parties and trade unions. This 
actor-centred approach argues that the Portuguese GMI success is attributable to a 
coalition among key domestic policy actors, while ambivalent and fragmented 
attitudes among Greek policy actors hindered institution. The recent decision for a 
GMI pilot in Greece should be viewed as a product of the severe economic crisis and 
state debt obligations that leave little space for ambivalence.  
 
1. Introduction 
Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI) belongs to the third generation of social 
assistance schemes, distinguished by the combination of monetary with social 
insertion measures. As a safety net, GMI aims to ensure individuals’ survival despite 
economic or social breakdown (Alcock, Erskine and May, 2002: 15 and 220), and 
serves as a measure of a society’s progress towards social citizenship (Benassi, 2002).  
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Up to the mid-1990s Portugal and Greece, representative cases of a ‘southern 
European’ welfare state or regime1, both lacked a GMI. This soon changed: Portugal 
introduced a pilot GMI programme in 1996 that became fully operational in 1997, 
whilst until 2012 Greece was one of a very few European countries never to have 
legislated such a scheme. The following explores possible reasons behind the 
comparatively early and long-lived Portuguese GMI, as against the long-standing 
‘failure’ of the Greek state to establish one.  
Notable studies on GMI for the two countries often underscore the salience 
and particularities of national political agendas and discourses. They include, for 
Portugal, contributions by Branco (2001), Carlos Rodrigues (2004 and 2011), 
Eduardo Rodrigues (2006), and Adão (2009); and, for Greece, Matsaganis (2004 and 
2013), Matsaganis and Levendi (2012), and the collective 2013 study of the Greek 
National Institute of Labour and Human Resources.  
Comparative approaches are more rare. Among them are a joint article on anti-
poverty policies in southern Europe by Matsaganis et al. (2003), a volume on welfare 
state reform in southern Europe edited by Ferrera (2005), and, more recently, Adão 
(2009: 196-206), who points to the convergence of Portugal’s reform agenda with the 
EEC policy strategy on social assistance, and to the absence of such a convergence in 
Greece as the key factors behind the ‘success’ of the Portuguese as against the Greek 
GMI experiences.  
Here we focus most on how governmental actors stand on GMI, while also 
acknowledging that the action of other key policy actors, such as trade union 
confederations, can affect relevant policy outcomes. GMI beneficiaries, often extreme 
outsiders with limited political representation, are forced to rely on such actors to 
promote their interests (Huber and Stephens, 2001: 18).  
In Portugal, the relatively stable party system that emerged in the post-
Revolution years includes the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Demócrata, 
PSD), the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, PS) and the Portuguese Communist 
Party (Partido Comunista Português, PCP) as major policy actors in the country’s 
political scene (Freire, 2005: 21-22). The main trade union confederations are the 
General Confederation of the Portuguese Workers (Confederação Geral dos 
                                                          
1 See e.g. Leibfried (1992), Ferrera (1996), Katrougalos (1996), Andreotti et al.(2001), Amable (2003), 
Hall and Gingerich (2004).  
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Trabalhadores Portugueses, CGTP) and the General Union of Workers (União Geral 
de Trabalhadores, UGT)2.  
In Greece, a party system of polarized pluralism gave way after 1981 to a 
predominantly two-party system. The pivotal domestic actors have included the 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα, ΠΑΣΟΚ, 
PASOK), New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία, ΝΔ, ND), and the Greek Communist 
Party (Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος, KKE) (Pappas, 2003); as well as trade union 
confederations such as the General Confederation of Greek Workers (Γενική 
Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών Ελλάδος, ΓΣΕΕ, GSEE)3.  
We assume the attitudes of policy actors towards GMI reflect the internal 
dynamics of given time periods in specific national context (Sotiropoulos, 2005: 288). 
Exogenous influences on domestic political agendas, such as those exemplified by 
‘soft-law’ instruments like the 1992 EEC Recommendation on common criteria 
concerning sufficient resources and social assistance, are mild; these depend for 
implementation on the discretion and thus the interests and ideological preferences of 
domestic policy actors.  
The following draws on interviews4, parliamentary archives and secondary 
sources. It is argued that the existence and persistence of a pro-GMI coalition among 
domestic policy actors made the Portuguese GMI a relatively timely and durable 
policy innovation. By contrast, the inconsistent and segmented attitudes of policy 
actors in Greece set up obstacles to the scheme’s institution.  
The next two sections discuss the Portuguese and then the Greek GMI 
experiences. The concluding section synthesizes the main lessons to be learned from 
this analysis.  
 
2. A Portuguese Success Story5  
A New Game in Town 
The 1990s opened for Portugal with the PSD’s electoral triumph in the 
October 1991 elections with 50.6 percent of the vote nationwide (135 seats), 
                                                          
2 This information draws on data from the European Trade Union Institute.  
3 See note 2.  
4 Between 2010 and 2012, 22 interviews were conducted in person (in Lisbon and Athens), via Skype 
or by e-mail, at the discretion of the interviewees and in accordance with their preferences. 
5 Writing on the Portuguese GMI story owes a lot to the invaluable help and generosity of Pedro Adão 
and Francisco Branco, who offered me inestimable advice and material on the research topic. My work 
builds on their work, to which I hope to have made a useful addition.  
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compared to the second-place PS, which received only 29.14 percent of the vote (72 
seats)6. The centre-right’s victory came in a period marked by the increased salience 
of Europeanization processes, and these were inter alia expressed in the 92/441/EEC 
Recommendation that urged EEC member-states to establish a GMI.  
In the Portuguese case the EEC Recommendation was of special importance, 
at least symbolically: it was shaped by principles agreed in June 1992, when Portugal 
held the EEC Presidency. The same PSD government that presided over the Council 
of Ministers who approved the Recommendation, however, had no intention of 
establishing such a scheme in Portugal.  
Among the explanations advanced for this inconsistency are that the scheme’s 
dossier was inherited from earlier EEC presidencies (Adão, 2009: 74). Among the 
reasons for the PSD’s decision not to establish a national GMI as given by José 
Albino Silva Peneda, Minister of Employment and Social Security at the time of 
Portugal’s EEC presidency (interview with author), he pointed to EEC 
Recommendations not being enforceable by law, and to severe budgetary constraints. 
The first of these claims was falsified a few years later, however, when the Socialists 
institutionalized a GMI. Likewise, as of 1992 no study had evaluated the potential 
costs of GMI, leaving the second claim unfounded (Luísa Guimarães, former Vice-
President of the Board’s Institute for Social Security, interview). 
The PSD’s decision not to make GMI an issue of the domestic political agenda 
conforms with the party’s profile: increasingly distant from the social democratic 
identity its name implies (Freire, 2005 and 2010), the PSD’s 1992 electoral 
programme made it clear that the state should avoid the temptation to provide too 
much to citizens, and instead prioritize initiatives by private entities (PSD, 1992: 16-
18 and 30-31). 
By not activating the process that would lead to the establishment of a GMI, 
nonetheless, the centre-right gave the opposition political capital that it might 
otherwise not have enjoyed (Branco, 2001: 129-130; Adão, 2009: 82). Now the PCP 
and especially the PS had the ball, and they would take the best possible position for 
playing the game. Trade union confederations, along with religious organizations, 
were also willing to offer support.  
 
                                                          
6 The data is from the Historical Archive of Parliamentary Election Results (Assembly of the 
Republic). 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 05:18:24 |
Social Policy (Κοινωνική Πολιτική), Issue 2, April 2014 – Dr Varvara Lalioti [DPhil (Oxon)] 
 
5 
 
Counting Friends and Enemies 
Between 1993 and 1995 the Socialists and the Communists secured for 
themselves a central role in the GMI debate. Milestones included the parliamentary 
discussion of the bills 309/VI (March 1994) and 385/VI (May 1994), prepared by the 
PCP and the PS respectively (Journal of the Assembly of the Republic, 1994a and b). 
Both invoked the need to conform to the 1992 EEC Recommendation, and still more 
to compensate for weakening family structures and growing poverty7. The timing of 
these debates, however, in the year before the 1995 general elections, suggests that 
Europeanization processes and poverty may not have been the only factors that 
shaped PCP and PS attitudes.  
The proposal to establish a GMI was compatible with the ideological profiles 
of both parties. The PCP’s Constitution described the Communists as following the 
ideas, gains, and historic achievements of the ‘April Revolution’ (PCP, 2010). 
Against this ideological background, GMI was considered a tool to help secure better 
living conditions for all Portuguese citizens, and the scheme proposed was more 
‘universalist’ than that proposed by the PS shortly afterwards8. Furthermore, for the 
traditionally anti-European PCP, with its electoral results declining, this period 
coincided with attempts to gain greater legitimacy by building bridges with the PS 
and abandoning Marxist orthodoxy (Bosco, 2001: 351; Costa Lobo, 2006: 9) and the 
principle that social assistance policies ‘destroy the class conscience of the proletariat 
in an incurable way’ (Rühle, 1939). 
After years of exclusion from power, on the other hand, the PS saw the GMI 
as an opportunity to affirm its commitment to protecting low-income groups and to 
catch up with the European social model (Adão, 2009: 75 and 82). For the Portuguese 
party most strongly linked with European institutions (Guimarães, interview; also 
Costa Lobo and Magalhães, 2001: 26), the GMI proposal also conformed to the 
party’s increasing ideological de-Marxification since 1986 (Magone, 2005: 506). 
These two parties knew they could count on the mobilization capacity and 
support of allies, both traditional and more recent. Among their traditional allies were 
the two major union confederations, which enjoyed strong links with both parties. The 
                                                          
7Journal of the Assembly of the Republic, 1994a: 1747, 1749 and 1751; Journal of the Assembly of the 
Republic, 1994b: 2474-2489; Branco, 2001: 129-130. 
8Journal of the Assembly of the Republic, 1994a: 1746-1768 (on the PCP proposal); Journal of the 
Assembly of the Republic, 1994b: 2474-2489 (on the PS proposal). 
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UGT and the CGTP had already adopted a pro-GMI position (USS/CGTP-In, 1994; 
also Branco, 2001: 124).  
The unions pursued this course in the expectation that GMI would be less a 
neo-charity social assistance scheme and more of a programme stressing social 
inclusion, in harmony with the labour movement’s permanent demand for protection 
of the right to employment (Paulo Pedroso, former President of the National GMI 
Commission, and former Secretary of State of Employment and Professional 
Training, interview). If the unions, moreover, always strived for a society that does 
not need schemes of this kind, they were nonetheless fully aware of the Portuguese 
socioeconomic reality and acknowledged that a GMI was vital for mitigating 
conditions of extreme poverty in the short-term (João Proença, General Secretary of 
the UGT, interview; also CGTP-In, 1996 and 1998; UGT, 1998: 9-10). 
Especially for the PS, which was less opposed to privatization, more recent 
allies were found in religious organizations such as Cáritas Portuguesa and the 
Misericórdias. Their commitment to solidarity accounts for their pro-GMI attitudes 
(Eugénio Fonseca, President of Cáritas Portuguesa and representative of the Private 
Institutions of Solidarity [Instituições Particulares de Solidariedade, IPSS] in the 
National Commission for Minimum Income, interview). 
Against this backdrop, the Socialists’ GMI proposal in particular stressed the 
need to involve a broad range of policy actors long active in the fight against poverty 
in the scheme’s design and implementation. It was anticipated that they would 
contribute to the scheme’s efficiency (Journal of the Assembly of the Republic, 
1994a: 1759 and 1994b: 2477). Due to the salience of the principle of subsidiarity in 
the Portuguese welfare state, moreover, the support and involvement of such actors 
would increase the legitimacy of the scheme and associated government actions, 
facilitating the GMI’s entrenchment in Portuguese society and culture (Adão, 2009: 
66). 
The Socialists’ decision to mobilize policy actors influential in the field of 
social assistance for the sake of GMI contrasted with the PSD’s ‘autistic’ style, 
particularly of its leader Cavaco Silva (Lisi, 2006: 61-62). Between 1992 and 1994, 
the PS leader, António Guterres, had already asked for the support of civil society 
actors to bring about what he called a ‘legislative contract’, i.e. an election 
programme that emphasized genuine partnerships between state and civil society 
(Stock and Magone, 1996; Magone, 2005: 509). 
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Negative experiences of coalitions with the centre-right and a lack of partners 
on the left forced the PS to stand alone in the forthcoming elections (Lisi, 2006: 61-
62). In these circumstances, like Britain’s New Labour, whose ‘Third Way’ 
pragmatism he largely emulated, Guterres was building a new majority to put an end 
to the centre-right’s long reign (Magone, 2005: 508-509). The GMI proposal might 
thus also be viewed as an attempt to broaden the party’s support base.  
Although the PCP and PS proposals failed to obtain a majority vote in the 
legislature, the two parliamentary debates put GMI squarely on the political agenda. 
GMI became a central part of the electoral campaign and a top issue in the media. 
Members of union confederations, especially the UGT, and representatives of 
religious organizations expressed their support for a GMI on television. In the press 
and in all his debates with Cavaco Silva, Guterres underlined the need for a GMI 
(Pedroso, interview).  
He would soon keep his promise.  
 
A Promise Kept: The Establishment of a GMI and the Strengthening of a Pro-
GMI Coalition 
The Socialists won the October 1995 elections with 43.93 percent of the 
national vote and 112 seats against the PSD’s 34.02 percent and 88 seats9. A few 
months later, the PS started the process of institutionalizing a national GMI. In the 
relevant parliamentary debate (May 1996), Ferro Rodrigues, the new Minister of 
Employment and Solidarity, referred to the Socialists’ aim to reinforce the support 
base of the scheme and secure its entrenchment within Portuguese society (Journal of 
the Assembly of the Republic, 1996a: 2214). Representatives of key policy actors, 
such as the trade unions and the religious organizations, participated in drafting the 
1996 GMI bill advanced by the PS (25/VII), which effected the scheme’s 
institutionalization (Fonseca, interview; also Journal of the Assembly of the Republic, 
1996a: 2214; Branco, 2001: 139 and 142-143).  
The monetary component of the Rendimento Mínimo Garantido (RMG) (Law 
19A/1996) bridged the difference between a family’s income and the social pension10, 
and was combined with a social integration programme (Rodrigues, 2004: 5 and 
Rodrigues, 2006: 179). RMG was introduced on a one-year experimental basis at the 
                                                          
9 See note 6.  
10 At that point 22,900 escudos, whereas the minimum salary was 58,900 escudos. 
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insistence of Paulo Pedroso, then Secretary of State for Employment and Training 
(Pedroso, interview). This decision partly reveals, once again, the priority the 
Socialists gave to enforcing and consolidating partnerships with other actors. The PS 
government reckoned that time was needed to get them more involved in building a 
national network of support for the scheme’s social inclusion component (Pedroso, 
interview; also Melícias and Pedroso, 1997: 101; Rodrigues, 2006: 184).  
It was not long before the Socialists further demonstrated their commitment to 
partnerships with influential policy actors in the cause of advancing the newly 
established scheme.  
 
United We Stand, Divided We Fall 
The experimentation period was shorter than expected, an outcome which 
Pedroso (interview) attributes to the existence of a very broad consensus behind the 
scheme in Portuguese society. In less than a year, more than 3,500 territorial actors 
(local governments), along with non-governmental organizations and local charities, 
submitted applications expressing their interest in participating in the RMG 
programme. Social solidarity proved to be particularly strong: in 146 local RMG 
projects, the actors/organizations involved totalled 475 municipalities, 119 IPSS, 74 
Misericórdias, two Mutual Aid Societies, seven business associations, two union 
confederations, and 107 other entities aimed at the promotion of social purposes 
(Melícias and Pedroso, 1997: 13, cited in Rodrigues, 2006: 184).  
To enforce linkages between these actors, the government proceeded to create 
a National GMI Commission and local monitoring commissions (Pedroso, 1998: 8). 
Although the financing of the RMG that came into force in July 1997 (Decree-Law 
196/1997) was a governmental responsibility, organizations such as Cáritas 
Portuguesa, CGTP, and UGT were asked to collaborate in these commissions together 
with entities representing the government and territorial actors. In this context, trade 
unions, for instance, provided the National GMI Commission with information about 
the working poor (Proença, interview).  
In addition to the government’s effort to consolidate and expand the pro-GMI 
coalition via formal state structures such as the aforementioned Commission, 
increasingly decentralized entities emerged that played a pivotal role in the RMG 
accompanying services. Examples were, at the parish level, the Social Commissions 
(Comissões Sociais de Freguesia), and Local Councils of Social Action (Conselhos 
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Locais de Acção Social). Municipalities and religious organizations were, once again, 
represented in these commissions and councils (Guimarães, interview).   
Just a few months later, a poll conducted by a team evaluating the RMG’s 
experimental phase corroborated its wide acceptance within Portuguese society: 92.8 
percent of respondents11 considered the RMG a scheme that was needed in Portugal 
(Capucha et al., 1998: 201-202; Adão, 2009: 91). Another indicator of the scheme’s 
popularity was that by assuming the scheme’s paternity, Ferro Rodrigues became one 
of the most popular ministers (Inácio, 2004). Against this backdrop, the PSD softened 
its attitude towards the scheme and publicly admitted its utility (Público, 1999: 7). 
The following years signalled, nevertheless, the beginning of a new period for 
the GMI in Portugal, one that continues today (Guimarães and Pedroso, interviews).  
 
The Post-2000 GMI Experience: Change, Change Again, but Also Survival 
In early 2000 the Court of Auditors conducted a review that confirmed the 
existence of irregularities in the scheme’s implementation, and the weakness of its 
social integration component (Court of Auditors, 2000). The latter was supposed to 
facilitate beneficiaries’ access to the labour market via participation in vocational 
training and community work programmes (Rodrigues, 2004: 4). After the broadening 
and consolidation of the pro-GMI consensus among a series of key policy 
actors/organizations, the years after the 2000 audit would be marked by a debate on 
the need to redesign the scheme. 
Criticisms were expressed not only by those who had opposed GMI in the first 
place, but also by actors favourable to the scheme, who asked for changes to increase 
its efficiency. The unions’ criticisms focused mainly on the RMG’s role in reinforcing 
privatization through the instrumentality of the IPSS, and on the RMG’s social 
integration component. The former reflected the CGTP’s firm anti-capitalist ideology, 
contrasting with the UGT, which had been more receptive to the notion of a socialist 
‘third way’ (Estanque, 2009).  
Both the CGTP and the UGT unsurprisingly agreed on the need to reinforce 
the scheme’s social integration component. Labour market integration is a traditional 
labour movement concern (Cristovam, 1999: 5-6). Religious organizations such as 
Cáritas Portuguesa, on the other hand, indicated that the RMG had to be provided in 
                                                          
11 Slightly more than 1,000 people. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 05:18:24 |
Social Policy (Κοινωνική Πολιτική), Issue 2, April 2014 – Dr Varvara Lalioti [DPhil (Oxon)] 
 
10 
 
accordance with looser residence criteria to cover immigrants (Público, 2002); and 
stressed the need for the RMG monitoring mechanisms to become more efficient 
(Fonseca, interview). 
In a context marked by the scheme’s broad acceptance by Portuguese society 
and acknowledgments from RMG beneficiaries themselves of the crucial role a pro-
GMI coalition played in their experience (Rodrigues, 2006: 495), reform was the only 
alternative. The centre-right coalition government of PSD and CDS-PP (Democratic 
and Social Centre-People’s Party, Centro Democrático e Social-Partido Popular) that 
emerged under Durão Barroso after the March 2002 elections, in which the two 
parties combined for 49.84 percent of the national vote (119 seats) as against 38.6 
percent (96 seats) for the PS12, advocated a change in the scheme’s philosophy that 
would strengthen the RMG’s social integration component (Peneda, interview; also 
Journal of the Assembly of the Republic, 2002: 16). To stress activation measures, the 
government furthermore altered the programme’s name to ‘Social Integration Income’ 
(Rendimento Social de Inserção, RSI) (Law 13/2003). 
The RSI introduced inter alia stricter eligibility rules, a lower ceiling for 
complementary benefits, and regulations to control fraud. Whilst the scheme’s 
monetary component topped up household income so it would reach the non-
contributory pension level (Rodrigues, 2011: 3), the RSI also included support 
programmes for beneficiaries in policy areas such as housing, health and education.  
Further modifications have since been made. In the shadow of the public debt 
crisis, the PS government of José Socrates and the succeeding PSD and CDS-PP 
coalition government of Pedro Coelho implemented a series of changes that included 
the abolition of some supplementary benefits connected with the scheme and the 
decrease of its monetary component13 (Decree-Law 70/2010; Administrative Act 
257/2012; Decree-Law 133/2012; Decree-Law 221/2012; Decree-Law 13/2013; also 
Institute of Social Security, 2013). 
The fundamental point, nonetheless, is that the scheme survived all criticism 
and changes. The RMG/RSI has resulted, moreover, in substantial improvements in 
measures of poverty intensity and severity (Rodrigues, 2004), as well as in the 
                                                          
12 See note 6. 
13 The amount varies depending on the composition of the family and the household income.  
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housing, health and education of beneficiaries (Rodrigues, 2006: 191), who in 
November 2013 equalled to approximately 235,00014.  
Overall, the story of the RMG/RSI in Portugal is one of success, and largely 
explainable by the existence and further enforcement of a pro-GMI coalition of 
domestic policy actors within the context of a broad consensus on the scheme.  
 
3.  The Curious Case of the Greek GMI  
The Road to Stalemate No.1 
In stark contrast to the Portuguese GMI experience, the relevant debate in 
Greece was marked among the key policy actors by a more rhetorical or at best 
fragmented interest, resulting in a long-lived inertia. In 1998, Georgios Sourlas, a 
deputy from the centre-right party of ND became the first to submit a parliamentary 
motion for a guaranteed minimum income mechanism. The motion was presented as a 
necessity of conforming with the 1992 EEC Recommendation and of reducing the 
high poverty rate (Sourlas, interview; also Parliamentary Proceedings, 1998b). 
In order to move the social conservatives within Sourlas’ own party, the 
motion’s introductory report described poverty as disastrous for the central cell of the 
Greek nation, defined as the family. For the sake of the family, the proposed scheme 
combined a monetary allowance with in-kind benefits, and not with the social 
insertion measures of a ‘traditional’ GMI programme. 
Sourlas (interview) represented ND’s social/populist right wing. He considers 
Panayotis Kanellopoulos, a prominent centre-right politician who believed in 
combining a liberal model of development with social-democratic principles, as his 
mentor. The timing of the Sourlas bill, exactly one day after the Standing 
Parliamentary Committee on Social Affairs had approved a draft law for a national 
system of social care (Parliamentary Proceedings, 1998a), is also remarkable. 
Regardless, however, of whether the initiative can be explained by Sourlas’ 
ideological preferences or other interests, the motion forced political parties to take a 
stance on a guaranteed minimum income mechanism. The 1998 parliamentary debate 
on the latter occurred among ND, PASOK, Synaspismos and KKE, which at that 
point commanded 108, 162, 10 and 11 parliamentary seats, respectively15.  
                                                          
14 Data from the Ministry of Solidarity, Employment and Social Security. 
15 The data is from the Greek Ministry of Interior. 
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The main argument used by the overwhelming majority of ND deputies to 
avoid supporting Sourlas’ motion was that the proposed mechanism would benefit an 
increasing number of immigrants at the expense of the Greeks in real need (Sourlas, 
interview).  In an effort to convince ND deputies to support it, the motion’s final 
version actually favoured an ‘ethnicity-based selectivity’16, stipulating that 
beneficiaries would only be Greek citizens.  
The ensuing parliamentary discussion (July 1999) is indicative of the minimal 
interest among the Greek political parties toward establishing a guaranteed minimum 
income mechanism (Parliamentary Proceedings, 1999: 489-510). The representative 
of PASOK, MP Evangelos Vlassopoulos, argued inter alia that the motion 
exaggerated the extent of poverty in Greek society (Parliamentary Proceedings, 1999: 
492-494). On behalf of the ‘Coalition of the Left and Progress’ (Συνασπισμός της 
Αριστεράς και της Προόδου, Synaspismos), Styliani Alfieri underscored that the 
proposal wrongly discriminated between the middle class and the neo-poor, and that it 
contributed to the one-dimensional development of ‘allowance policies’ 
(Parliamentary Proceedings, 1999: 496-497).  
The KKE, at that point the strongest party of the traditional left in Greece, 
likewise opposed the motion, on the ground that the solution to poverty lay in 
securing the right to employment, not in policies distracting the poor from the class 
struggle necessary to combat marginalization (Parliamentary Proceedings, 1999:  
495). KKE’s position was thus strikingly different from that of the PCP in Portugal; a 
differentiation reflecting how the traditionally anti-European KKE has remained an 
orthodox Communist party, closely bound to Marxism, unlike other southern 
European Communist parties, which have become more ideologically flexible (Bosco, 
2001: 330 and 341).  
Unsurprisingly, Sourlas’ motion was voted down without need of a roll call. 
The speaker of the Parliament asked those in favour to stand, then announced that 
there were too few to pass the proposal (Parliamentary Proceedings, 1999: 509). Thus, 
the parliamentary proceedings do not tell us even how many ND deputies eventually 
supported the proposal.  
This was the situation on the eve of the April 2000 elections, when PASOK 
put GMI back on the political agenda despite the fact that intra-party workshops 
                                                          
16 See Matsaganis, 2011: 210-211 and 223 on the constraints posed by migration and racist views to 
social protection.  
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revealed no clear tendency for or against the scheme’s introduction17. This effort 
would ultimately result in a second stalemate.  
 
The Road to Stalemate No.2  
After the Socialists’ election victory with 43.79 percent of the national vote, 
just ahead of the second-place ND with 42.74 percent18, the Minister of Employment 
and Social Insurance, Tasos Giannitsis (interview) formed a group of experts to 
discuss anti-poverty measures, GMI included. The scheme’s establishment conformed 
with the new prime minister’s profile as a modernizer of the state apparatus and as a 
statesman capable of resolving social antagonisms in accordance with European 
principles (Simitis, 1989 and 1990). Nevertheless, the group abandoned the idea of a 
GMI. A central argument was that the causes of poverty differed for different 
population groups, so that the scheme would be inadequate to combat them (Ministry 
of Labour and Social Security, 2001: 7-19). They instead proposed an increase in 
interventions focused on selected groups, a strategy the government adopted.  
To Matsaganis’ claim (2004: 20) that the abandonment of the GMI proposal 
was due to fears of the scheme’s financial repercussions at a time when the country’s 
integration into the European Monetary Union (EMU) was the main policy objective, 
Giannitsis (Interview) adds three more reasons: first, that the government had opted 
for  measures, such as an increase in the pension provided by the Agricultural 
Insurance Organization (Οργανισμός Γεωργικών Ασφαλίσεων, ΟΓΑ, OGA), that, 
along with the minimum  pension, could be regarded as functional equivalents to a 
GMI. Second, the Ministry of Economy and Finance and its Minister, Nikos 
Christodoulakis, opposed a GMI. The Ministry, specifically its tax agency, would 
have to perform many of the procedures connected with its introduction, while 
receiving little credit for a scheme that another Ministry would design and announce. 
The economy and finance ministry instead favoured a “Milton Friedman” type of 
GMI, i.e. a negative income tax system, in which individuals earning a certain income 
level would pay no taxes. Third, Giannitsis (interview) underscores the existence of 
an environment hostile to the scheme, because of the unions’ fierce reaction to the 
government’s stated intent to reform the social insurance system.  
                                                          
17 Information based on the interview with Christos Polyzogopoulos, former president of the General 
Confederation of Greek Workers (Γενική Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών Ελλάδος, ΓΣΕΕ, GSEE).  
18 See note 15.  
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Is Giannitsis right about the latter? The official journal of the union 
confederation GSEE, ‘Update’ (Ενημέρωση) mentioned GMI as ‘a tool for the fight 
against poverty’ (Update, 2003: 12). If not openly hostile, however, the trade union 
leadership was hesitant about the prospect of establishing the scheme: even prominent 
labour movement cadres who did not oppose GMI feared that it would lead to the 
open contestation and subsequent abolition of the national minimum wage, and a 
decrease of the minimum pension (Polyzogopoulos, interview; Savvas Rombolis, the 
research director of the GSEE Institute of Labour, interview). 
A set of complementary reasons arguably explain this attitude. An 
institutionalized GMI might shrink the slice of the pie going to ‘insiders’, thus 
reducing their incentive to welcome the scheme. In contrast, very strong forces were 
ready to defend accumulated privileges and existing inequalities. As a high-profile 
Greek economist, who prefers to remain anonymous, argues (Anonymous, interview), 
trade union confederations in Greece are particularly reluctant about policy initiatives 
that will secure the rights of the lowest socioeconomic strata. As he explains, the 
confederations largely represent the interests of the most privileged employees, i.e. 
the staff of the public sector and public utility organizations. Therefore, they are not 
particularly solidaristic (also Matsaganis, 2011: 41-42 and 80-81).  
The GMI debate reinforced cleavages in the ruling party. In December 2000, 
Theodoros Tsoukatos, an associate of Prime Minister Kostas Simitis whose 
relationship with the latter had been deteriorating (To Vima, 2008), advanced a bill 
signed by 52 of PASOK’s 158 deputies favouring introduction of a GMI. At a time 
when the government had opted for alternative policies, Simitis saw the proposal as a 
vengeful act of internal opposition (Ethnos on Sunday, 2000). Tsoukatos’ proposal 
was never discussed. 
After a one-month break the discussion within PASOK on the possibility of 
establishing a GMI began again, and continued for a few more months 
(Polyzogopoulos, interview). The governing party’s intentions were still unclear, 
however (also Matsaganis, 2004: 22). Indicative of the Socialists’ inconsistency on 
the issue was that among those who supported Tsoukatos’ proposal was Vlassopoulos, 
the same MP who presented PASOK’s objections to Sourlas’ 1998 motion19.  
                                                          
19 This information draws on a media report issued by Sourlas’ political office (29 July 1999). 
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In July 2003, the authors of the ‘National Action Plan for Social Inclusion, 
2003-05’ once again rejected the GMI option (Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security, 2003: 30-32). Similarly, rumours of a governmental intention to establish a 
GMI on the eve of the 2004 elections were soon falsified in practice (Matsaganis, 
2004: 23).  
PASOK was not the only political party with an ambivalent attitude towards 
the issue, however. In an effort to build a ‘social-friendly’ profile, as opposed to the 
neo-liberal profile of the earlier ND government under Konstantinos Mitsotakis 
(Papadokostopoulos, 2007), ND’s leader Kostas Karamanlis flirted for several years 
with the GMI prospect, both while in opposition and in government (Matsaganis, 
2004: 22-25; Tsouparopoulos and Triantafyllou, 2006). Partly because of internal 
opposition to the scheme within ND, and partly because of the political cost linked to 
the possibility of abolishing a large number of welfare benefits for the sake of a GMI, 
ND abandoned the idea (Sourlas, interview).  
In fact, Synaspismos, at that point the weaker leftist parliamentary party, was 
the only party to submit bills for a GMI20. The first (in 2002) was never discussed; it 
had been advanced after the statutory deadline for parliamentary debate. The second 
(in 2005) was blocked from a vote on grounds that the Constitution (Article 73, 
Paragraph 3) permits no legislation to be passed that would cause a significant budget 
increase (Parliamentary Proceedings, 2005a and 2005b).  
As Dragasakis argues (interview), Synaspismos opted for a more 
‘conservative’ GMI, having in mind the examples of Portugal and Italy rather than the 
Scandinavian experience. He asserts this choice was largely due to the ambivalent (or 
even hostile) views within PASOK and ND, and the lack of a social movement to 
support Synaspismos’ proposal, again in contrast to the Portuguese GMI experience. 
Dragasakis (interview) admits that there was confusion over the GMI concept 
even within Synaspismos, largely attributable to the fact that the neo-liberal Milton 
Friedman was among the very first to have spoken in the scheme’s favour, albeit in 
the form of a ‘negative income tax’. Furthermore, Dragasakis underscores that 
whenever Synaspismos’ GMI proposals were presented to broader audiences, 
participants always ended up asking questions concerning their own financial and 
social problems rather than about the proposed scheme. 
                                                          
20 This paragraph draws on the interview with Giannis Dragasakis, MP of Synaspismos.  
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Although no vote followed the discussion of the 2005 motion, the relevant 
debate is telling. ND’s ‘official’ position was against establishing a GMI, with only a 
few ND deputies expressing views in favour (Parliamentary Proceedings, 2005b: 
2152, 2155, 2162 and 2164). PASOK’s stance was also far from unanimous. Tonia 
Antoniou, in her presentation of PASOK’s ‘official’ position, accepted the need for a 
GMI (Parliamentary Proceedings, 2005b: 2171). High-profile party members such as 
Nikos Christodoulakis, however, claimed that the Simitis governments’ social 
assistance policy initiatives already corresponded, in practice, to an 
institutionalization of GMI, and that the proposal might lead to the retrenchment of 
purchasing power among the financially weak (Parliamentary Proceedings, 2005b: 
2167-2168).  
Finally, KKE remained loyal to its stand against GMI as a manifestation of the 
political system’s inability to secure citizens’ rights to employment, arguing that GMI 
beneficiaries would end up used as cheap labour by capitalists (Parliamentary 
Proceedings, 2005b: 2155-2158; also Rizospastis, 2004). Viewed in conjunction with 
the Synaspismos proposals, KKE’s position reflects the high ideological 
fragmentation of the Greek left, as compared to the Portuguese (Kouvelakis, 2011: 
29-31). 
The GMI card was played for the last time on the eve of the 2007 elections, 
this time by ND (Tsouparopoulos and Triantafyllou, 2006). Karamanlis won the 
elections with 41.84 percent of the vote nationwide against PASOK’s 38.1 percent21, 
but once again ND did not move to establish a scheme. 
A new period followed both for the Greek state and the GMI, however. 
 
The Final Act 
The years since 2008 have seen the combined impact of a severe economic 
crisis and of the austerity measures adopted first by George Papandreou’s socialist 
government (in 2010 and 2011) and then by a coalition government under ND’s new 
leader, Antonis Samaras, in power since June 2012. In exchange for unprecedented 
rescue packages, both governments committed to meeting the rules of loan 
agreements and the so-called Memoranda agreements with the European Commission 
(EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
                                                          
21 See note 15.  
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 05:18:24 |
Social Policy (Κοινωνική Πολιτική), Issue 2, April 2014 – Dr Varvara Lalioti [DPhil (Oxon)] 
 
17 
 
Ratified by Parliament amid fierce protest, the new policies aimed inter alia at 
significantly reducing public spending and effecting structural change in the 
administrative machinery22. 
Against this backdrop, the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy for 2013-2016 
stipulated the institutionalization of a pilot GMI to be initiated in two regions starting 
in January 2014 (Law 4093/2012, Subparagraph IA.3). The credit for the pilot is 20 
million Euros23. A decision for or against a permanent GMI nationwide will be taken 
after the pilot is evaluated. 
This decision may appear paradoxical, given past ambivalence toward GMI 
among key policy actors. In a time marked by the unprecedented consequences of the 
crisis and the country’s massive obligations to creditors, demands for a GMI such as 
the one expressed by the IMF (IMF, 2012: 19-20; Matsaganis, 2013: 13) have left 
little space for ambivalence. The scheme’s institutionalization is part of a plan 
targeting a radical reform of the highly segmented and ineffective social expenditures 
in Greece, and conforms with the country’s obligation to legislate new welfare 
programmes for vulnerable population groups (Law 3845/2010, Article 2; also 
Matsaganis, 2013: 14; Amitsis, 2013: 69-70).  
Extremely strong pressures on the domestic policy arena, as opposed to the 
mild ones of the 1992 ‘soft-law’ EEC Recommendation, increase the incentive for 
policy actors to break through the sclerosis surrounding GMI. The scheme provides 
the coalition government under Samaras an opportunity to express interest in the 
needs of the lowest socioeconomic strata at relatively low cost and with possible 
electoral gains.  
Within the government, GMI found a new ally in the Democratic Left 
(Δημοκρατική Αριστερά, ΔΗΜΑΡ, DIMAR). Comprising prominent representatives of 
the reformist left, DIMAR received 6.25 percent of the national vote in the May 2012 
elections24 and participated in the government until June 2013. It was outspoken in its 
support for GMI (Democratic Left, 2012; Matsaganis, 2013: 14; Kostoulas, 2013).  
Meanwhile, the political scenery is undergoing drastic transformations, with a 
small party previously without hope of building a government, Synapismos (now the 
‘Coalition of the Radical Left’, ΣΥΡΙΖΑ, SYRIZA) becoming the strongest contender 
                                                          
22 See e.g. the ‘repository’ of the Crisis Observatory http://crisisobs.gr/en/repository/.  
23 Journal of the Greek Government, vol. A, no. 229/2012, p. 5697.  
24 See note 15. 
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for power almost overnight in the 2012 elections. The government’s GMI initiative 
deprives SYRIZA of the opportunity to benefit politically from the GMI’s 
establishment (see SYRIZA’s 2012 electoral programme; Matsaganis, 2013: 13-14). 
The dire economic context makes the establishment of a guaranteed safety net, 
as the proposed GMI promises, all the more urgent. Somewhat alarmingly, and as an 
indication of the improvisational and procrastinating nature of the Greek state 
machinery, as of March 201425 the ministerial decisions relating to the scheme have 
yet to be issued and, thus, the GMI pilot is far from starting on schedule.  
Furthermore, the Ministry of Employment and Social Protection has asked the 
World Bank for a study on the design and implementation of the proposed GMI. This 
will arguably further delay and jeopardize the launch of the pilot scheme. In a country 
where support for the scheme among policy actors remains largely segmented26, the 
danger is that any GMI effort will prove very short-lived, as was the case with the 
national GMI in neighbouring Italy.  
Thus, broadening the support base for the scheme, alongside a well-designed 
implementation, is a gamble that the government cannot lose.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The Portuguese experience illustrates the importance of having and 
reinforcing a pro-GMI domestic coalition among key policy actors for the 
establishment and maintenance of such a scheme. PSD’s refusal to institute GMI left 
room for PCP and PS to put it on the domestic political agenda. The ideological 
preferences and interests of these actors explain their stance, just as the ideological 
preferences and interests of the trade union confederations and religious organizations 
in Portugal account for their support from the very beginning.  
The Socialists attempted to broaden the existing consensus further, first as part 
of their election strategy, and later to increase the GMI’s effectiveness and 
consolidate its place in the Portuguese welfare state. The scheme’s high level of 
societal acceptance, reflected in the shorter than anticipated experimentation period, 
also led the centre-right parties to soften their attitude, thus securing the GMI’s 
survival.  
                                                          
25 At the time of this writing.  
26 See e.g. Matsaganis, 2013: 26; National Institute of Labour and Human Resources, 2013: 94-95; 
Rizospastis, 2013: 5; Poulakidas, 2013.  
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The Portuguese experience indicates the relatively low degree of polarization 
between the left and right ideological blocs with respect to social issues (Freire, 2005: 
32). In a similar vein, the positive stance of Portuguese unions towards GMI is related 
to the relatively unfragmented nature of Portugal’s labour movement (Ioannou and 
Kjellberg, 2005: 346 and 354-355). This has contributed to the pursuit of common 
policies by the different confederations.  
Fishman (2010: 288-289) has argued that a broadly shared commitment 
among all major political actors to address social concerns through state action is one 
of the legacies of the Carnation Revolution. In an environment already largely 
favourable to GMI, one factor behind the Socialists’ insistence on building consensus 
and entrenching the coalition in its favour may be that the spirit of the Revolution, a 
spirit particularly sensitive to collectivity and collective action, is still alive and well 
in Portugal. 
In stark contrast to the Portuguese experience, the rhetorical or at best 
fragmented interest in GMI among Greek policy actors resulted in the state’s long-
standing ‘failure’ to establish a scheme. Although both PASOK and ND flirted with 
GMI on the eve of general elections, establishment was hindered by the far from 
unanimous support within each of the two parties. Similarly, the traditionally 
fragmented left splintered over the scheme, while trade unions distrusted it.  
Historical trends have reinforced fragmentation of Greek trade union 
associations along political lines, contributing to their failure to represent all groups of 
Greek citizens (Someritis, 1933: 52). Different political factions constitute different 
organizations within the same confederation, making it harder for the Greek labour 
movement to adopt a uniform stance even on issues of common sectoral concern. This 
has arguably hampered the development of a political culture that enables consensual 
reforms, especially with respect to social issues and the well-being of ‘outsiders’.  
The recent Greek decision for a pilot GMI should be viewed as a result of the 
country’s severe crisis and massive debt, which have forced introduction of the GMI 
on the domestic political agenda. The scheme provides the Greek coalition 
government with a chance to show interest in low-income groups for a limited 
economic cost and with possible electoral gains; and it prevents the strongest 
opposition party, SYRIZA, from playing the GMI card in the next elections.  
Whilst delays in the launch of the pilot GMI illustrate the deficiencies of the 
Greek state apparatus, the scheme’s viability rests not only on the need for a well-
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designed implementation, but also on the broadening of the support base among 
policy actors and within society: in other words, on the growth of a political culture 
that will favour consensual policy reforms for the sake of ‘outsiders’, which appears 
to be quite weak in Greece. In that respect, the Portuguese experience is particularly 
didactic.  
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